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INSURANCE LAW-New Mexico Recognizes the
Administrative/Medical Services Distinction: Millers
Casualty Insurance Co. of Texas v. Flores
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Millers Casualty Insurance Co. of Texas v. Flores' the New Mexico
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the term "professional services" as
it is used in businessowners insurance policy exclusions. The court liberally
construed the term, holding that the professional services exclusion 2 waived
the insurance carrier's liability when an untrained doctor's assistant negligently administered an injection.' The court based its interpretation of
"professional services" on the distinction between administrative and
medical services. 4 In doing so, the court drew a distinction that is at
best marginally effective and at worst arbitrary.
This Note will provide an overview of analogous case law from other
jurisdictions, examine the rationale of the Millers decision, and explore
the potential ramifications of Millers in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5
Estefana Flores suffered a stroke after receiving a contraindicated
injection 6 from Florence Curtis, an assistant 7 to Flores' physician, Dr.
1. 117 N.M. 712, 876 P.2d 227 (1994).
2. The "Deluxe Businessowners Policy" of Millers Casualty Insurance Company of Texas at
issue stated:
[Tihis policy does not apply . . . to bodily injury or property damage due to [the]
rendering of or [the] failure to render any professional service, including but not
limited to: (a) legal, accounting, advertising, engineering, drafting, architectural,
and (b) medical, dental, pharmacological, cosmetic, hearing aid, optical, or ear
piercing services ....
Id. at 714, 876 P.2d at 229.
3. Liability stemmed from actions that were not professional in nature. If the actions were
professional, then the exclusion waived the carrier's liability. See id.
4. Losses related to medical services were excluded under the professional services clause of
the businessowners policy; losses related to administrative services, closely related to operating a
business, were covered. See id. at 715-16, 876 P.2d at 230-31.
5. All references within this section are found at 117 N.M. at 713, 876 P.2d at 228, unless
otherwise cited.
6. Flores received injections of estrogen-type drugs to alleviate symptoms related to menopause.
See Appellant's Brief in Chief at 1, Millers, 117 N.M. 712, 876 P.,2d 227 (1994) (No. 20190). Her
medical file stated that estrogen should never be administered to her as she had a history of
thrombophlebitis and treatment with estrogen or estrogen-based drugs was unsafe for her. Id.
7. Ms. Curtis' position as assistant is central to this case but her designated duties as assistant
are unclear. Appellant referred to Curtis as an unsupervised and untrained assistant. Id. at 2. In
an amicus curiae brief, the Trial Lawyers Association concurred. Brief for the New Mexico Trial
Lawyers Association at 1, Millers, 117 N.M. 712, 876 P.2d 227 (1994) (No. 20190). Appellee classified
Ms. Curtis as a physician's medical assistant, Appellee's Brief in Chief at 1, Millers, 117 N.M.
712, 876 P.2d 227 (1994), but Flores conceded that Curtis' actions were medical in nature. Millers,
117 N.M. at 714, 876 P.2d at 229. Ms. Curtis had no training as a nurse or medical assistant.
She was trained as a phlebotomist but her experience was mainly in retail and clerical work. Id.
at 714 n.1, 876 P.2d at 229 n.l.
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Harry Winkworth. Dr. Winkworth did not supervise Curtis nor did he
sufficiently train her to administer the injection. Flores brought suit
against Dr. Winkworth and his professional corporation for medical
malpractice, negligent employee hiring, training, and supervision. Flores
subsequently settled the malpractice claim but sought damages under the
remaining theories. 8
Prior to the incident, Millers Casualty Insurance Company of Texas
("Millers") sold Dr. Winkworth a "Deluxe Businessowners Policy" which
provided him and his business with comprehensive general liability coverage. This policy was in effect at the time of Flores' injury. It excluded
coverage for losses related to professional services. 9
After Millers was named in the suit, it filed a declaratory judgment
action against Flores, Curtis, Dr. Winkworth, and his professional corporation claiming that the policy exclusion exempted it from any duty
to defend or indemnify Dr. Winkworth or his corporation. In response
to Millers' action, Flores moved for summary judgment, asserting that
the exclusion clause did not exculpate Millers from its duty to defend
or indemnify. Millers then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
asserting that Dr. Winkworth's policy, "unambiguously excluded liability
for injury arising out of 'professional services." ' " 0 The trial court granted
Millers' motion for summary judgment, ruling that Curtis' actions were
"professional services" and Millers' policy excluded coverage for loss
resulting from such services. Flores appealed to the New Mexico Supreme
Court, which affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Millers.
III. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
A businessowners insurance policy provides liability coverage for loss
stemming from premises liability and administrative aspects of a business."
It generally excludes losses relating to professional services such as medical,
legal, engineering, and architectural malpractice. 2 Therefore, comprehensive liability insurance carriers exclude coverage for certain claims
related to the rendering of professional services to limit their liability
and reduce costs for policy holders."' In this way, comprehensive liability
insurers keep policy costs low for all policy holders. The exclusions must
14
be unambiguous to be valid and enforceable.

8. Flores settled the malpractice claim by stipulating to a $500,000 settlement that the district
court declared "fair and equitable." Appellee's Brief in Chief at 1, Millers, 117 N.M. 712, 876
P.2d 227 (1994) (No. 20190).
9. See supra note 2.
10. Millers, 117 N.M. at 713, 876 P.2d at 228.
I1.Id. at 714, 876 P.2d at 229.
12. Carrying professional insurance is a recommended and generally required practice in many
professions. 7A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 4505, at 324
(Walter F. Berdal ed. 1979).
13. See id. at 325. By excluding an area of potentially expensive liability, such as all liability
resulting from the rendering of medical services, the general liability insurance carrier is able to
offer coverage at a more reasonable price.
14. See Williams v. Herrera, 83 N.M. 680, 684, 496 P.2d 740, 744 (Ct. App. 1972)(holding that
the court would construe any ambiguity in policy coverage wording against the insurer).
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The essential issue in construing the professional services exclusion at
issue is its scope. Determining whether an untrained medical assistant's
acts are included in the professional service exclusion, or whether they
are administrative services for which the insurer is liable, is difficult.
Although a court may hold an exclusion is unambiguous, the policy itself
is often unhelpful because the exclusion wording is non-exhaustive and
only provides examples of excluded services. 5
Other Jurisdictions Have Attempted to Formulate Working
Distinctions Between Medical and Administrative Actions
Courts are split over how to determine whether an action is administrative or medical in nature. Although the distinction seems to be one
of common sense, courts have focused on different characteristics in
determining an action's classification. Courts generally look at one of
four areas in distinguishing between professional and administrative actions: (1) the timing of the action, (2) the nature of the action, (3)
whether the action falls within a theory of non-delegable duty for the
professional, or (4) the chain of events leading up to the incident.
A.

1. Timing of the Action
A number of courts have found the crucial factor to be the timing
of the action causing the injury. If the action occurred during medical
treatment, it is a professional service and the loss is therefore excluded.
In Antes v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,16 the plaintiff, a chiropractor,
sought to recover from his general liability insurer when a heat lamp
fell from its mounting and injured a patient.17 The California appellate
court ruled that a professional services exclusion in the chiropractor's
general liability insurance policy exempted the insurance carrier from
covering the injury because it had occurred during chiropractic treatment."
Even though the doctor's actions did not cause the injury, 9 the court
found that the timing of the incident brought the act under the exclusion's
control.
In Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. ,20
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a professional services
exclusion effectively waived the insurer's liability for an injury resulting
from the negligence of a medical technician. 2' In Alpha Therapeutic, a
medical technician improperly transcribed hepatitis test results, causing

15. See Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Herzber's, Inc.,
1938) (holding that the definition of "professional services" is not
645 (1939).
16. 34 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
17. Id. at 510.
18. Id. at 511.
19. Testimony at trial showed that improper installation of the
The plaintiff had not installed the heat lamp; it was installed by the
another chiropractor. Id. at 510.
20. 890 F.2d 368 (l1th Cir. 1989).
21. Id. at 370.

100 F.2d 171, 173 (8th Cir.
clear), cert. denied, 306 U.S.

heat lamp caused the injury.
previous tenant of the office,
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the shipment of tainted blood to be sent to Alpha Therapeutic Corporation
("Alpha"). 2 2 Alpha brought suit against the Hunter Blood Center
("Hunter") for the resulting damages. 23 Hunter's general liability insurance
policy included a professional services exclusion. 24 Hunter argued that "a
medical technician does not have the requisite training to qualify as a
professional and that the technician's job of transposing test results is
not a professional service." ' 25 Nevertheless, the court held that the transposing of test results and figures was part of the professional services
Hunter provided; therefore, the exclusion waived the insurance carrier's
26
liability.
One drawback to this type of analysis is that it does not take into
consideration the title of the actor or the actor's occupational training.
A second flaw is that this approach does not analyze the timing of the
27
ultimate cause of the injury.
2. The Nature of the Action Most Proximately Causing the Injury
In Mason v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,2" a Louisiana court held
that the nature of the injurious action should control rather than the
timing of the action or the title of the negligent actor. 29 In Mason, a
student nurse administered an injection that injured the plaintiff. 0 The
trial court granted summary judgment for Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company based on a professional services exclusion included in the policy
it issued to the infirmary. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's ruling, reasoning that "we should look not to
the title or the character of the party performing the act but to the act
itself."'" Because the student nurse administered the injection as part of
a certified medical program, the court found that the injection itself
constituted professional services and was therefore excluded from coverage
2
under the policy.
This type of approach analyzes the nature of the action causing the
injury but limits the scope o*f analysis to the action that most proximately
caused the injury. It does not extend to the underlying causes of the

22. Id. at 369.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 369-70.
26. Id.
27. For example, in Antles the ultimate cause of the injury was not the rendering of medical
services but the improper installation of equipment by someone other than the insured. See Antles,
34 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
28. 370 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1967).
29. d. at 926.
30. d. The student nurse administered the injection in the presence of a surgeon and the student's
supervisor. As a result of the injection, plaintiff suffered nerve degeneration and loss of control
of his right foot. Id.
31. d. (quoting D'Antoni v. Sara May Hosp., 144 So. 2d 643, 646 (La. Ct. App. 1962)); see
also Multnomah County v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 470 P.2d 147, 150 (Or. 1970) (holding that the
court must examine the action taken and not the title of the actor when determining the scope of
professional services exclusions).
32. See Mason, 370 F.2d at 926.
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injury. For instance, in Mason the court did not examine the administrative
component of the decision to let a student nurse administer the injection."
3. The Non-Delegable Duty of a Professional
Some courts have focused on the professional's non-delegable duty to
provide adequate services to deny coverage under an exclusion provision.
In Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. Superior Court of California,"
a California appellate court held that the non-professional status of a
physician's assistant did not "alter the professional nature of . . . [the
Doctor's] nondelegable duty." 3 5 In Northern Insurance, a clerical employee
of a doctor of obstetrics mistook one patient for another and directed
the doctor to perform an abortion on the wrong patient.3 6 The court
focused on the physician's exclusive and ever-present duty to operate on
the right patient. The court found that even when a "physician utilizes
the assistance of a nonphysician in the performance" of his or her duties
'3 7
it does not "alter the professional nature of that nondelegable duty.
At first glance, this approach appears to require little analysis to
determine a distinction between administrative and medical services. If
the action is related to the performance of medical services, then it is
medical rather than administrative. However, the distinction drawn by
this approach is potentially arbitrary because, to some extent, all services
performed by a doctor's staff are related to the performance of medical
services.
4. An Expansive Causation Analysis
Still other courts have focused on the series of events that contributed
to the injury. Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance
Co." involved a psychiatric patient who killed herself by jumping from
the fourth floor window of a hospital.3 9 The patient was admitted "with
directions that she be placed in the hospital's 'closed' unit"; because the
closed unit was full, the hospital placed the patient in a less secure area.1°
The patient jumped to her death after she opened the window in her
4
hospital room. 1
After a jury awarded the decedent's estate damages for the hospital's
negligence, the hospital's general liability carrier sought to avoid liability
for the judgment through a professional services exclusion in the hospital's
policy .42

33. It is arguable whether the decision to let a student nurse administer injections on patients
rather than limiting the student's education to artificial models is an administrative one.
34. 154 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Ct. App. 1979).
35. Id. at 200.
36. Id. at 199.
37. Id. at 200.
38. 909 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 134.
40. Id. While the window screens in the "closed" unit were attached to the windows so that
patients could not escape, the windows in the less secure area lacked this precaution. See id. at
134, n.l.
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id. at 135.
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The Fifth Circuit held that the hospital's decision to prevent psychiatric
patients from escaping by screwing the hospital windows shut rather than
installing protective screens over the windows was administrative in nature,
not medical.4 Therefore, the court determined that the policy required
liability carrier to cover the liability of the hospital."
theIngeneral
an analogous case, Keepes v. Doctors Convalescent Center, Inc. ,4
an Illinois court ruled that the negligent actions of a nonprofessional
employee that resulted in injury to a retarded child were not professional
services.4 6 The child suffered severe burns when his aide left him unattended near a radiator while preparing his bath.4 7 The court concluded
that the injury resulted from the aide's negligence, but did not focus on
her job title: "[w]hile . . . [the employee] was called a nurses' aid, she
was working as a maid." ' 48 Reasoning that the aide's services were con-

nected with "normal living," the court found that the negligence resulted
from an administrative rather than a professional decision.4 9 Accordingly,
the carrier was not exempted from liability.
This approach focuses on the underlying causes of the injury. It
examines the entire chain of events leading to the injury; it is not limited
to the action most proximate to the injury. This approach is sufficiently
detailed to analyze complicated chains of events leading to an injury but
requires a thorough analysis of each decision and action leading to that
injury.
In sum, few jurisdictions have squarely addressed the distinction between
administrative and medical services. Of those jurisdictions which have
ruled on the subject, the majority have upheld professional services policy
exclusions and barred recovery for the negligence of medical aides and
assistants. Courts have employed varied methods of distinguishing between
administrative and medical services.5 0 The lack of case law and meaningful
analysis on the subject leaves this area of the law open to speculation,
argument, and opportunity.
IV.

RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF MILLERS

Rationale of the Millers Court
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that Curtis' action in administering an injection was a medical service included in the professional

A.

43. Id. at 136.
44. Id.
45. 231 N.E.2d 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
46. Id. at 276.
47. Id.at 275.
48. Id.at 276.
49. Id.
50. In fact, some jurisdictions have not limited their analysis to applying only one method of
distinction. For example, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a distinction based on a thorough analysis
of the cause of the injury in Guaranty National Ins. v. North River Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 133, 13537 (5th Cir. 1990), a distinction based on the nondelegable duty of a professional in D'Antoni v.
Sara May Hosp., 144 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (La. Ct. App. 1962), and a distinction based on the
nature of the action most proximately causing the injury in Mason v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
370 F.2d 925, 926 (5th Cir. 1967).
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services exclusion, waiving the insurer's liability for Flores' loss. 5' In

reaching its decision, the court began by examining Flores' argument
that the professional services exclusion did not prevent coverage of her
claims.12 Flores argued that the policy exclusion did not extend to her
claims that Dr. Winkworth negligently hired, supervised, and failed to
train Curtis.5 3 Flores contended that those actions were the result of
business or administrative, not medical decisions: "Dr. Winkworth's decision[s] ... were administrative decisions rather than the rendition of
medical services, and ... these decisions were removed in time from
Curtis's act of failing to render adequate medical care." '5 4 Therefore,

Flores argued that the medical service exclusion did not preclude recovery
of her claims.
The court disagreed, discounting Flores' argument that Dr. Winkworth's
decisions relating to Curtis' hiring, training, and supervision were administrative in nature. 5 Instead, the New Mexico Supreme Court grounded
its logic in precedent from other jurisdictions5 6 particularly Mason v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.17 Relying on Mason, the court recognized

a distinction between professional and administrative actions based on
the nature of the action. 8 But the New Mexico court ultimately based
its ruling on Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. Superior Court
of California.9
In Northern Insurance, a California appellate court held that the nonprofessional status of a physician's assistant did not "alter the professional
nature of

. .

. [the Doctor's] nondelegable duty [to administer the proper

medical services to patients]." 6 The Millers court found that hiring and
training assistants were included in Dr. Winkworth's medical services and
was not a business-related activity. 6' Therefore, Dr. Winkworth failed to
render adequate medical services when he hired an unqualified assistant

51. Millers argued that Curtis' actions constituted professional services and were therefore excluded
from Millers' coverage. Millers, 117 N.M. at 713, 876 P.2d at 228.
52. Id. at 714, 876 P.2d at 229. Flores conceded that the primary purpose of the insurance
policy was "to cover against liability arising from premises liability" and that Curtis' act of
administering the contraindicated injection was a medical service. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. In doing so, the court distinguished Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. North River
Insurance Co., 909 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990), on which Flores relied, because Curtis' actions involved
professional judgment whereas the hospital's failure to secure the windows did not. Millers, 117
N.M. at 716, 876 P.2d at 231. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 714, 876 P.2d at 229.
57. 370 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1967). See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
58. Millers, 117 N.M. at 714-15, 876 P.2d at 229-30. The court also cited Alpha Therapeutic
Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 890 F.2d 368 (1lth Cir. 1989), see supra notes 20-27
and accompanying text, thereby adopting a distinction based on the timing of the injury. The court
did not explain its reliance on Alpha Therapeutic as precedent, and therefore the rationale behind
it is unclear.
59. Millers, 117 N.M. at 715, 876 P.2d at 230, (citing Northern Ins. Co. of New York v.
Superior Court of California, 154 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Ct. App. 1979)); see supra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text.
60. Northern Ins., 154 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
61. Millers, 117 N.M. at 715, 876 P.2d at 230.
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and failed to adequately train and supervise her. 62 The court stated that
the non-professional employee's acts were professional/medical services
because the physician ultimately bore the responsibility for actions taken
by the employee. 6 By relying on the rationale of Northern Insurance,
the court implicitly adopted the non-delegable duty analysis as a way of
defining professional services in New Mexico.M
The court touched briefly on the distinction between ordinary negligence
and medical malpractice in response to plaintiff's argument that Dr.
Winkworth's negligent hiring, training, and supervising of Curtis constituted ordinary negligence. 65 Because it determined that Dr. Winkworth's
actions in hiring, supervising, and training Curtis were medical in nature,
the court ruled that his actions constituted medical malpractice, not
ordinary negligence. 66 Therefore, the resulting liability was professional
in nature and was excluded from the policy Millers issued to Dr. Winkworth.
Finally, the court examined the wording of the exclusion itself and
concluded that it was sufficiently unambiguous to act as a valid and
enforceable prohibition of coverage. 67 The court found that the exclusion
in the Millers policy was sufficiently clear to exclude coverage because
it included an itemized list of professional services. 6 The specificity with
69
which the exclusion was drafted removed any ambiguity.
B.

Implications: The Distinction Between Administrative and
Professional Activities

1. Millers as Precedent for Future Cases
Millers cannot effectively act as precedent for future New Mexico
decisions. This is because the Millers court relied on cases that contradict
each other in analysis method. By doing so, the court implicitly adopted
multiple methods of differentiating between administrative and professional services. The Millers court also failed to explore the connection

62. Id. The court cited Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 260 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Ct. App. 1989) for
the proposition that physicians have a professional responsibility to "insure the competence of its
medical staff", and failure to do so is "professional negligence." Id.
63. Millers, 117 N.M. at 715, 876 P.2d at 230.
64. The court also likened the present case to Fire Ins. Exch. v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah
1985). Millers, 117 N.M. at 715, 876 P.2d at 230. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
65. The court stated that it did not intend to draw a clear distinction between the two theories
of recovery. Millers, 117 N.M. at 716, 876 P.2d at 231.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 2 for the precise wording of the exclusion. The court cited Vihstadt v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 465, 709 P.2d 187 (1985) and Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien.
99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983) as analogous precedent for its ruling. Millers, 117 N.M. at 71617, 876 P.2d at 231-32. The claim that a policy's terms are ambiguous is one potential argument
in an insurance case. See Williams v. Herrera, 83 N.M. 680, 496 P.2d 740, (Ct. App. 1972)(holding
that ambiguity in policy terms is construed against the insurer).
69. Millers, 117 N.M. at 716, 876 P.2d at 231.
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between an employee's negligent actions and an administrator or doctor's
negligent hiring and training practices.
a. Adoption of Multiple Methods of Distinction
The Millers court recognized a method of distinction based on the
timing of the action 70 and a method of distinction based on the theory
of non-delegable duty7 in determining whether the cause of Flores' injury
was medical or administrative. The court, however, did not thoroughly
develop either method of distinction. As a result, it remains unclear
which test will be used to make a legal determination of medical or
administrative classification in the future. Consequently, insurance carriers, doctors, and lawyers cannot know what the controlling factors of
analysis are in a "professional services" case.
b. Where Does Medical Judgment End and Business Sense Begin?
The Millers court also failed to explore the connection between an
employee's negligent actions and an administrator's or doctor's negligent
hiring and training practices. The court examined Dr. Winkworth's actions
as one continuous exercise of professional judgment. The court said the
hiring, training, and supervising of his assistant constituted the rendering
of "professional services" because he bore the ultimate responsibility for
his assistant's actions.7 2 But common sense dictates that there must be
some point at which Dr. Winkworth's decisions required administrative,
not medical, judgment. Future personal injury negligence cases will require
further clarification of what is required for an action to be categorized
as medical or administrative.

73

C. A Potential Problem Not Addressed in Millers: The Changing
Composition of Personnel in the Medical Profession
Although the differentiation between administrative and medical actions
may seem like a matter of common sense, a thorough examination of
today's medical services industry illustrates that it is not. Indeed, the
difference between administrative and professional medical decisions may
have lost its meaning.7 4 With significant advances in medicine and the

70. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 34-37, 59-64 and accompanying text.
72. Millers, 117 N.M. at 716, 876 P.2d at 231.
73. It is likely that the court could not use Millers to fashion a practical distinction between
administrative and medical decisions because Flores conceded that Curtis' actions were medical in
nature and that coverage of those services was not the primary purpose of the policy. Id. If future
plaintiffs do not concede that the injurious actions were administrative or medical, the presiding
court will be forced to determine the true nature of the service rendered. The court that does so
will greatly clarify the scope of administrative and medical services exclusions in New Mexico.
74. The cases cited for the premise that there is a definable common law distinction between
administrative and medical decisions date predominantly from the late 1960's and early 1970's when
there was a smaller patient/physician ratio and not as many medical para-professionals. See Mason
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1967); Antles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 34
Cal. Rptr. 508 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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rapid growth of the medical industry in the last twenty years, the composition of the medical profession's personnel has changed dramatically.
The ranks of highly trained personnel have been joined by aides, assistants,
and technicians who generally receive less training than physicians but
often participate in rendering medical services. 75 These individuals perform
activities that were previously the duties of nurses and doctors (such as
medical record maintenance, treatment preparation, and patient hygiene).
As a result, the line between administrative and medical actions is increasingly unclear.
Specialist physicians hire, train, and supervise assistants and staff of
all types, yet not all of those employees are integrally related to the
rendering of "professional services." For instance, a pediatrician's receptionist is not integrally related to the doctor's treatment of a child's
pneumonia, yet the receptionist's actions may be considered part of the
medical service under Millers. Nevertheless, the amount of interaction
these employees have with files, patients, and the patients' environment
create a great risk of harm if performed negligently. The process of
hiring, training, and supervising assistants requires physicians to exercise
administrative and managerial, rather than medical judgment. It would
be absurd to exclude claims for all actions related to the operation of
a business, but if that business is the rendering of medical services, there
is nothing to prevent it under Millers.
The court must clarify what methodology will control the classification
of an action as medical or administrative. Millers does not sufficiently
explain the determinative factors for analysis. By recognizing more than
one method of distinction the court has left this area of law ambiguous.
It is unclear whether the timing of the action is controlling or the presence
of a non-delegable duty related to that action is the essential factor.
There are shortcomings in each method of distinction 76 and the court
may clarify the distinction by formulating its own method. An approach
involving a thorough analysis of the cause of the injury could sufficiently
treat even the most complicated of cases but may not be necessary for
more rudimentary cases. 77 Regardless of which distinction method the
court adopts, it must be sufficiently clear to be of use to insurers,
insureds, and the attorneys handling personal injury cases, sufficiently
thorough to handle complicated chains of events leading to injury, and
sufficiently adept to scrutinize cases in the framework of the changing
composition of personnel in the medical profession.
V. CONCLUSION
In Millers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Flores, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that the professional services exclusion in a businessowners
75. The requisite training for these positions depends on the employer. Some require training
courses from accredited medical training institutions while others require no formal specialized
training.
76. See supra notes 16-50 and accompanying text.
77. Nevertheless, establishing the thorough analysis method of distinction would not bar cursory
treatment of cases in which the classification of an action or actions is indisputable.
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policy waived the insurance carrier's liability when an untrained doctor's
assistant negligently administered an injection.78 However, the court failed
to provide a sufficiently clear distinction between administrative and
medical services. The holding demonstrates that the traditional distinction
between administrative and professional services is ineffective. In highly
specialized areas of medicine which work in tandem with important
administrative support, there is a great risk that individuals sustaining
injuries may slip through the cracks of both medical malpractice and
general liability insurance coverage. Millers recognizes multiple ways of
drawing the distinction between administrative and medical decisions for
the purpose of insurance policy exclusions but does not clearly adopt a
test for doing so. Millers does not clarify the distinction between medical
and administrative services; it manifests the need for more clarification.
CHRISTINE M. HOEFT

78. 117 N.M. 712, 876 P.2d 227 (1994).

